Prestige drives epistemic inequality in the diffusion of scientific
  ideas by Morgan, Allison C. et al.
Prestige drives epistemic inequality in the diffusion of scientific ideas∗
Allison C. Morgan,1, † Dimitrios J. Economou,1, ‡ Samuel F. Way,1, § and Aaron Clauset1, 2, 3, ¶
1Department of Computer Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA
2BioFrontiers Institute, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA
3Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA
The spread of ideas in the scientific community is often viewed as a competition, in which good
ideas spread further because of greater intrinsic fitness, and publication venue and citation counts
correlate with importance and impact. However, relatively little is known about how structural
factors influence the spread of ideas, and specifically how where an idea originates might influence
how it spreads. Here, we investigate the role of faculty hiring networks, which embody the set of
researcher transitions from doctoral to faculty institutions, in shaping the spread of ideas in computer
science, and the importance of where in the network an idea originates. We consider comprehensive
data on the hiring events of 5032 faculty at all 205 Ph.D.-granting departments of computer science
in the U.S. and Canada, and on the timing and titles of 200,476 associated publications. Analyzing
five popular research topics, we show empirically that faculty hiring can and does facilitate the
spread of ideas in science. Having established such a mechanism, we then analyze its potential
consequences using epidemic models to simulate the generic spread of research ideas and quantify
the impact of where an idea originates on its longterm diffusion across the network. We find that
research from prestigious institutions spreads more quickly and completely than work of similar
quality originating from less prestigious institutions. Our analyses establish the theoretical trade-
offs between university prestige and the quality of ideas necessary for efficient circulation. Our results
establish faculty hiring as an underlying mechanism that drives the persistent epistemic advantage
observed for elite institutions, and provide a theoretical lower bound for the impact of structural
inequality in shaping the spread of ideas in science.
I. INTRODUCTION
A core principle of scientific progress is the free ex-
change of ideas, which enables the best ideas to spread
throughout the scientific community. But, some ideas
spread further than others, and these differences cre-
ate a kind of epistemic inequality [1], in which some re-
searchers and institutions are far more influential than
others. These observed inequalities may reflect the im-
pact of genuine differences in merit, or the importance of
non-meritocratic factors associated with whom or where
an idea originated, or both. Past studies of scholarly pro-
ductivity show dramatic epistemic inequality: scientists
at elite institutions produce the majority of research ar-
ticles [1], play an outsized role in setting the pace and
direction of scientific achievement [2–5], and receive the
majority of both professional awards and recognition [6–
10].
Such differences alone, however, are not clear evidence
that epistemic inequality is driven by non-meritocratic
social mechanisms, and there are very few data-driven
tests for such mechanisms. As a result, it remains un-
known how the spread of an idea may depend on where
it originated in the scientific community. Moreover, if the
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point of origination does shape its fate within scientific
discourse, what is the relationship between the idea’s in-
trinsic fitness and the structural advantage afforded by
the prestige of the origin? Progress on these questions
would shed new light on systematic inequalities in scien-
tific discourse and inform efforts to mitigate structural
impediments to scientific progress. We also note that
academia represents a kind of model system for study-
ing socially-mediated information diffusion, as publica-
tions and institutions create a rich data ecosystem. As
a result, insights on the spread of ideas in science may
also yield new insights into other information diffusion
settings, such as online social environments [11–13].
Past work on non-meritocratic factors that influence
the spread of ideas in science has focused on two cate-
gories: institutional prestige and researcher prestige. Elite
departments are known to provide resources that facili-
tate high rates of productivity and innovation [14, 15],
including research funding, departmental staff, quality
graduate students, and advanced facilities. Access to such
resources can attract intrinsically talented researchers
and foster environments that may naturally produce bet-
ter ideas [16–19].
Similarly, researcher influence itself can follow a cu-
mulative advantage dynamic, called the “Matthew Ef-
fect” in science, in which productivity and notoriety fa-
cilitate greater subsequent productivity and notoriety.
As a result, well-known scientists tend to receive more
credit than lesser-known scientists for work of compara-
ble quality [8]. Furthermore, faculty in prestigious depart-
ments tend to be more visible to the research community
[20, 21], which can facilitate the spread of their ideas [22–
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224]. This greater visibility is often attributed to higher
publication rates, greater representation in elite publica-
tion venues [25], and greater engagement in informal sci-
entific communication, e.g., circulating manuscripts and
face-to-face communication [17].
Here, we take a different approach, focusing instead
on characterizing how faculty hiring drives epistemic in-
equality by determining which researchers are located
at which institutions, and hence what ideas originate
where. Faculty hiring can act as a transmission mecha-
nism for the spread of research ideas, because researchers
carry ideas that have been reinforced during their doc-
toral studies [26] to their faculty institution [27]. In this
way, if a department becomes newly active in a particu-
lar research topic, it must have either hired as faculty
a researcher who already works on that topic, or one
of its existing faculty changed their research interests to
align with the topic (e.g. via many other possible mech-
anisms such as conferences, social media, etc.). Hence,
graduates who train under these faculty, who themselves
go on to take faculty positions at still other institu-
tions, and students of those faculty, etc., represent the
continued spread of the idea, via faculty hiring alone,
throughout the scientific community. From a historical
perspective, the adoption of Feynman diagrams via the
hiring of a small group of post-doctoral researchers from
a single institution, represents an example of this mech-
anism [28, 29].
To test the hypothesis that research ideas can spread
to new universities through faculty hiring, we begin by
analyzing the timing and topics of 200,476 computer sci-
ence publications, and the hiring dates of 2,583 associated
faculty. Having found evidence to support this hypoth-
esis, we then use comprehensive data on 5,032 faculty
hires at the 205 Ph.D.-granting departments of computer
science in the U.S. and Canada to construct a faculty
hiring network that embodies the conduits along which
ideas may flow among institutions. Using numerical sim-
ulations of simple epidemic models on this network, we
quantify the impact on how far ideas of different inherent
quality spread as a function of different originating insti-
tutions within the network. We find that ideas originating
from prestigious universities spread faster and more com-
pletely than ideas from less prestigious universities, and
we extract a generic “exchange rate” function that quan-
tifies the tradeoff between increasing university prestige
and decreasing quality of a research idea for generating
an epidemic of a particular size.
The concept of a “research idea” can span a diverse set
of definitions, ranging from the development of a pioneer-
ing analysis technique or algorithm to the novel synthesis
of previously disjoint observations. In Section III, we eval-
uate hiring as one possible mechanism for the spread of
ideas by identifying particular research topics via key-
words in publication titles. For modeling purposes, in
Section IV we adopt a purposefully abstract definition of
a “research idea” as a meme with some intrinsic quality
represented by the probability of transmission between
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FIG. 1. Average length 〈`〉 of a geodesic path originating from
a university with prestige pi, in the strongly connected compo-
nent of the computer science faculty hiring network, showing
a strong linear correlation between a node’s “closeness” cen-
trality and its prestige
two connected institutions. Accordingly, we consider the
spreading of ideas at the level of institutions, where the
adoption of an idea by a department is signaled by hav-
ing at least one faculty member who’s published research
on that topic. This construction is amenable to most rea-
sonable concepts of a research idea and sheds light on the
implicit tradeoffs between idea quality, network position,
and the extent to which it spreads through the scientific
community.
II. HIRING AND PUBLICATION DATA
Our study employs two comprehensive and comple-
mentary data sets. One contains detailed education and
employment histories of faculty at Ph.D.-granting com-
puter science (CS) departments in the U.S. and Canada,
along with data-driven estimates of each institution’s
“prestige.” The other contains the set of publications
written by individual faculty who are listed in the first
data set. Below we describe each in detail.
A. Faculty hiring network
We utilize an existing hand-collected data set of 5,032
tenured or tenure-track faculty from the set of all 205
Ph.D.-granting computer science departments in the U.S.
and Canada [27]. From these data, we construct a multi-
edge, directed faculty hiring network in which nodes rep-
resent universities, and an edge (u, v) exists if a person
received their Ph.D. from university u and held a tenure-
track position at university v during the 2011–2012 aca-
demic year. Universities may have many edges between
them, representing multiple researchers trained at u who
3took a position at v. This network also contains self-loops,
corresponding to individuals who received their Ph.D. at
the same institution at which they hold a faculty posi-
tion. We have omitted all non-Ph.D.-granting universities
from our analysis, as well as faculty who received their
Ph.D. from out-of-sample institutions.
B. Departmental prestige
Each institution in the data set is annotated by a
data-driven estimate of its “prestige” within the faculty
hiring system [27], and we use this covariate to struc-
ture our investigation of how ideas spread differently de-
pending on where the originate. Here, prestige measures
a department’s ability to place its graduates as faculty
at other institutions, which has been shown to corre-
late with other departmental rankings (e.g., those com-
piled by U.S. News & World Report and the National
Research Council), but more accurately predicts faculty
placement [27].
Past research on visibility in science suggests that sev-
eral institutional characteristics contribute to the suc-
cess of individual researchers, in particular department
size and prestige [20, 23]. Size is considered an “almost
necessary” condition for excellence [17] among academic
departments, which require a minimum number of fac-
ulty in order to achieve sufficient breadth in research.
However, other studies find that department size is only
a weak predictor of success [18, 30] or has diminishing
effect [31, 32] on the research output of faculty.
In contrast, departmental prestige is consistently an
excellent predictor of faculty placement outcomes [27,
33], and hiring a graduate of u as faculty at v can be
viewed as a kind of implicit endorsement of the perceived
quality of u. Prestige also tends to correlate with de-
partment size and output [5], but also allows small de-
partments to have high placement power, or large de-
partments to have low power. In addition to prestige,
we also considered how other network-derived depart-
ment characteristics correlated with spreading power,
including eigenvector, in-degree (department size), out-
degree (number of placed faculty), and closeness cen-
trality scores. Of these, departmental prestige correlated
most strongly, and hence we focus our investigation on
how departmental prestige shapes the dissemination of
research ideas.
Departmental prestige represents a node-level at-
tribute extracted from the faculty hiring network, which
is defined as a directed multigraph G = (V,E), with
|V | = N nodes. A prestige hierarchy is defined as a map-
ping pi : V → [1, N ], where pii is the prestige of node i,
by convention pii = 1 is the highest prestige possible, and
the number of “rank violations” is minimized. A rank vi-
olation is simply some edge (u, v) ∈ E where the prestige
of v exceeds the prestige of u, i.e., the edge points “up”
the hierarchy. In practice, however, there are many rank-
ings pi with the same fraction of rank violations, and the
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FIG. 2. Coarsened adjacency matrix of the computer science
faculty hiring network, sorted by prestige and aggregated into
10 groups. Shading is proportional to the density of edges be-
tween a pair of prestige deciles, and the strong upper triangle
pattern indicates a strong prestige hierarchy.
prestige variable we use is the average prestige rank 〈pii〉
over all minimum violation rankings [27].
There are three features of the CS faculty hiring net-
work that are relevant for our study. First, the prestige
hierarchy is steep, with only 12% of CS faculty placing
at institutions more prestigious than their doctorate. Sec-
ond, it has a pronounced core-periphery structure [27], in
which prestige correlates with how “close” in the network
a department is to other departments, as measured by the
mean geodesic distance (Figure 1). Third, there is enor-
mous inequality in faculty production, and the number
of placed faculty (out-degree) correlates with department
prestige (Figure 2). This inequality is sufficiently extreme
that only 18 (of 205) departments account for the doctor-
ates of 50% of all CS faculty in our data set [27]. Hence,
in a practical sense, prestige drives faculty hiring.
C. Faculty publications
We also utilize an existing data set of papers authored
by a subset of CS faculty listed in the faculty hiring net-
work data set [33]. These data enable an empirical test of
the mechanistic hypothesis that faculty hiring drives the
spread of research ideas. Validating this mechanism pro-
vides the theoretical basis for our subsequent simulation-
based investigation.
In-sample faculty for this data set are those from the
faculty hiring network for whom both the doctoral de-
partment is known and the department of the first as-
sistant professor appointment is known, which is the pri-
mary transition for faculty hiring. For these faculty, pub-
lication records were obtained by manually linking fac-
4ulty profiles to publication records on DBLP,1 an online
database spanning major computer science journals and
conference proceedings. The result is a list of the tim-
ing and titles of 200,476 publications by 2,583 professors,
which has previously been shown to be a representative
sample [5, 33].
III. FACULTY HIRING AND EPISTEMIC
INEQUALITY
The strong core-periphery structure of the faculty hir-
ing network implies that, in terms of spreading dynamics,
elite institutions have a structural advantage. However,
investigating the consequences of this structure is only
meaningful if scientific ideas can and do spread by way
of faculty hiring. In this section, we construct a simple
test to evaluate whether faculty hiring is a mechanism
that shapes the spread of ideas in the academic computer
science community. This test can be carried out for any
research area with a well defined and specific set of asso-
ciated terminology, and which is widely adopted across
the community. Here, we apply the test to five well-known
areas that satisfy these criteria: (i) “deep learning,” (ii)
“topic modeling,” (iii) “incremental computation,” (iv)
“quantum computing,” and (v) “mechanism design.”
For each topic, a list of 7–56 keywords was generated
manually for us by a set of at least two experts working
within the corresponding field. Using the DBLP publica-
tion data for our in-sample CS faculty, we then extracted
the associated set of publications for a topic using simple
keyword matching on publication titles, with a manual
verification step to guarantee each paper’s topical rele-
vance, yielding 1116, 217, 71, 167, and 122 publications
respectively. Searching for words in titles will likely re-
sult in an under-classification of publications relevant to
a research topic. For the measures of ideas transmitted
via faculty hiring considered below, since we require that
relevant research is carried out at their institution before
and after their hiring, it is possible that we have classified
events which should have been labeled as a transmission
due to hiring as not. Given this approach, our measure-
ment of research adoption via hiring is likely a conserva-
tive estimate or lower bound on the true number of such
events.
Finally, for each faculty member j at each department i,
we construct an indicator time series fi,j(t) = 1 if faculty
j published an on-topic paper in year t, and fi,j(t) = 0
if they did not. We then mark this time series with the
year t∗j in which j was hired into the department.
For each department i, there are three scenarios for
whether and how a topic X spreads to i:
1. (Null) X never spreads to department i, and hence
for each faculty j at department i, fi,j = 0.
1 See http://dblp.uni-trier.de
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Time employed by department Publication on Idea X
FIG. 3. If an idea X spreads to a department, the first person
to work on X must either be (A) a newly hired faculty with
prior work on X (hiring adoption), or (B) an existing faculty
without prior work on X (non-hiring adoption). Black lines
depict a faculty’s time at a university, and purple dots signify
relevant (on topic) publications.
2. (Hiring) X spreads to i (or, i “adopts” X) by the
hiring of new faculty j who has previously pub-
lished on X (Figure 3A), i.e., a “transmission” of
X from one department to another, carried by the
new faculty j. In this case, no faculty at i has pub-
lished on X prior to the t∗j , faculty j has published
on X prior to t∗j + 2, and j publishes on X sub-
sequently. The choice of allowing j’s “prior” work
on X to occur up to 2 years after their faculty hir-
ing event captures the fact that work carried out
before being hired can take several years to be for-
mally published.
3. (Non-hiring) X spreads to i by one of their exist-
ing faculty publishing on X for the first time (Fig-
ure 3B). In this case, some faculty j at i publishes
on X prior to the hiring of any new faculty who
have previously worked on X, without themselves
representing scenario 2.
Inspecting the time series of hiring events at all 205
universities, we recover a total of 241 spreading events
for the five topics, each affecting between 11% and 58%
of departments. Of these events, 88 (37%) are due to
transmissions of research ideas by way of hiring, and in
81% of these cases, transmissions move via faculty from
higher prestige universities to lower prestige universities
(past studies show that only 9 to 14% of faculty place-
ments move faculty to a more prestigious university than
their doctoral institution [27]). Figure 4 illustrates these
patterns by showing spreading events over time, for three
of the topics.
Crucially, if faculty hiring shapes the spread of ideas,
then a significant share of departments that ever adopt
a topic X will have adopted it through faculty hiring
(scenario 2). We test this hypothesis by constructing a
specialized permutation test to assess the statistical sig-
nificance of the empirically observed fraction of depart-
ments that have adopted a research idea via scenario 2,
denoted fobs, and the expected fraction of such depart-
ments fexp. The test’s null model is one in which the
publication years for each faculty are fixed with their
empirical values, but paper titles are drawn uniformly at
random, without replacement, from the set of all titles.
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FIG. 4. Adoption events for the three research topics over
time. Purple dots denote institutions who adopted an idea by
hiring someone who studies that topic, and white dots rep-
resent institutions whose existing faculty began working on
the topic. Arrows denote, for each time period, new trans-
missions, originating from the hired individual’s doctoral lo-
cation. All 205 institutions are arranged clockwise by pres-
tige (descending), with the most prestigious department po-
sitioned at noon.
TABLE I. Comparison between observed and expected adop-
tions via hiring for each research topic
topic X fobs fexp p
topic modeling 0.35 0.23 0.01±0.01
incremental computing 0.39 0.20 0.01±0.01
deep learning 0.35 0.34 0.34±0.01
quantum computing 0.32 0.22 0.01±0.01
mechanism design 0.48 0.21 0.01±0.01
In this way, serial correlations in topics and temporal
correlations with the hiring event are removed from each
faculty. We then report empirical p-values [34] for the
fraction of hiring-driven adoption events for each topic.
For all five research topics, the observed fraction of
adoptions by hiring fobs exceeds the expected fraction
fexp under the null model. However, the observed frac-
tion was only statistically significant in four of five topics,
topic modeling, incremental computing, quantum com-
puting and mechanism design, while no significant differ-
ence was found for deep learning (Table I).
These results indicate that faculty hiring appears to
act as a mechanism for the spread of ideas, with differen-
tial effects by topic, across the computer science commu-
nity. Faculty hiring has mostly clearly shaped the spread
of topic modeling and incremental computing, and the
lack of significance for deep learning is interesting. As
previously discussed, this null result could be spurious,
as the sampled nature of our data make it likely that
we have underestimated the true share of departments
that adopted a topic by hiring. However, it could also be
related to the broad popularity of and interest in deep
learning itself, which led to many more adoption events
that were not driven by hiring. This case highlights the
fact that faculty hiring may not play a statistically sig-
nificant role in the spread of every research idea. At the
same time, the other cases indicate that hiring does play
a statistically significant role in others. The sample of
research topics analyzed here should by no means be
considered exhaustive, and, as such, we make no claims
about the extent to which all research ideas spread via
this mechanism. Instead, our results here establish that
faculty hiring is a possible mechanism for the diffusion
of ideas in academia, and we welcome future research to
further explain which ideas spread by hiring and why.
IV. PRESTIGE AND THE DIFFUSION OF
IDEAS
Having established empirically that faculty hiring it-
self plays a role in shaping the spread of real ideas across
the scientific community, we now investigate the aggre-
gate, system-level consequences of faculty hiring, and the
links it creates between departments, on the spread of
ideas, using numerical simulations. Our first model as-
sumes faculty hiring is the sole mechanism by which re-
search ideas spread throughout academia, and then we
relax this assumption by allowing for diffusion via other
mechanisms. This approach allows us to characterize how
where an idea originates, and in particular the prestige of
the originating department, shapes how broadly an idea
may spread through faculty hiring, as a function of the
idea’s intrinsic quality. Hence, we quantify the degree to
which ideas originating from more prestigious universi-
ties may spread more broadly than equally good ideas
from less prestigious universities.
A. Modeling the spread of ideas
We model the spread of an idea across the CS faculty
hiring network using a simple network model of informa-
tion diffusion. Formally, this model is equivalent to an
SI model in network epidemiology, repurposed here to
model the spread of a meme [35].
In this model, nodes are in either a “susceptible” (S)
or an “infected” (I) state; all nodes begin in state S; and,
only the S → I state transition is allowed (no remission
from infections). In the sense of ideas spreading, a depart-
ment that adopts an idea (scenario 2 or 3 in Section III)
undergoes the S → I transition. If some node u under-
goes the S → I transition, then in the next time step of
the simulation, each of its susceptible neighbors indepen-
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FIG. 5. Normalized epidemic size Y/N as a function of pres-
tige of the originating university pi. Each data point represents
an average result over 1000 trials of the simulation. Colors
correspond to different transmission probabilities p.
dently undergoes the S → I transition with probability
p, where the chance for transmission of an idea across an
edge is only allowed once (though multiple edges can ex-
ist between institutions). This probability quantifies the
intrinsic quality or transmissibility of the idea, so that
higher values of p represent ideas that spread more eas-
ily. Finally, to initialize the simulation, a particular node
u is selected to undergo the S → I transition, and time
then progresses until no new nodes transition to the I
state. This model assumes an independence between the
prestige of node u and the transmissibility of the idea p
originating at that node. Additionally, more complicated
epidemiological models are not considered here, but rep-
resent interesting directions for future work. For exam-
ple, the SIS model allows a department to return to the
S state, e.g., by losing all its faculty who publish on a
given topic. This model could be used to study the ebb
and flow of interest in a topic across the network.
For each department u in the hiring network, we run a
large number (10, 000) of SI simulations with u as the ini-
tial node, and we measure the mean epidemic size Y , i.e.,
the fraction of universities in state I when the diffusion
stops, and mean epidemic length L, i.e., the number of
time steps in the simulation. We then evaluate how these
quantities covary with the prestige pi of the originating
department, and the transmissibility of the idea p.
B. Results
Simple SI Model
These information diffusion simulations show that
ideas that originate at more prestigious universities tend
to spread farther (larger epidemic size) than those origi-
nating at less prestigious universities, for ideas of similar
quality (Figure 5).
This difference reveals a structural advantage that cor-
relates with university prestige and its impact is most
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FIG. 6. Normalized epidemic length L/` as a function of pres-
tige of the originating university pi. Each data point represents
an average result over 1000 trials. Each curve is colored cor-
responding to different transmission probabilities p and fitted
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pronounced for lower-quality ideas. That is, lower-quality
ideas (smaller p) that originate at more prestigious in-
stitutions will tend to spread farther than comparable
ideas (same p) that originate at less prestigious insti-
tutions. Accordingly, increasing p has a more dramatic
effect on increasing the corresponding epidemic size pro-
duced by lower prestige institutions. In other words, our
simulations suggest that high-quality ideas will tend to
spread throughout the network regardless of where they
begin (although at different timescales, Figure 6). But,
the structural advantage of higher prestige tends to en-
hance the circulation of lower-quality ideas, and is likely
related to the way prestige correlates with with increased
network centrality and more faculty alumni. Notably,
these simulation results corroborate past empirical stud-
ies of the effects of prestige on researchers’ citations and
visibility [20, 22].
To model the effect of prestige pi on the size Y of the
resulting epidemic, we fit logistic curves to the results:
Y
N
= ymax
/
1 + e−k(pi−pimid) ,
where ymax is the upper bound of the size, k is the growth
rate, and pimid is the symmetric inflection point. The good
visual agreement between a logistic growth curve and our
simulation results (Figure 5) suggests that for a particu-
lar idea fitness p, there exists a range of prestige values
within which linear increases in prestige result in expo-
nential increases in epidemic size. For smaller values of
p, this range is concentrated among the most prestigious
universities, reflecting their structural advantage. As p
increases, the range shifts progressively toward lower-
prestige universities. In other words, for linear increases
in p, we observe non-linear epidemic sizes.
We also find that prestige shapes how long ideas tend
to circulate in the network, as measured by the length
L of the epidemic, normalized by the average length of
a geodesic path ` from the originating university (Fig-
7ure 6). This ratio L/` quantifies the degree to which an
idea circulates beyond or below the shortest-path perco-
lation. For high-quality ideas (larger p), we find that the
epidemic length L tends to be similar regardless of where
an idea originates, although there is a slight positive cor-
relation with prestige. However, lower-quality ideas from
higher-prestige universities circulate much longer than if
they originate from lower-prestige universities, again il-
lustrating the structural advantage that prestige affords
in the diffusion of ideas when we consider faculty hiring
as the only mechanism by which ideas spread.
SI Model with Jumps
We now relax the importance of faculty hiring by
introducing a stochastic “jump” into the transmission
model, which models the aggregate effect of other spread-
ing mechanisms—word-of-mouth, professional meetings,
reading the literature, social media, etc.
Because faculty hiring tends to be highly selective on
the prestige of hiring and placing institutions [27], some
universities are disconnected from large sections of the
faculty hiring network. However, ideas that originate
at these peripheral universities should still have some
chance to spread through means other than faculty hir-
ing or the communication conduits created by those re-
lationships. To capture this effect, in the lifetime of an
epidemic, each university u that has made the S → I
transition, in addition to its faculty hiring transmissions,
will also transmit the idea to exactly one university, se-
lected uniformly at random from u’s set of unreachable
nodes, with “jump” probability q. This process mirrors
the “teleportation” probability of random walkers in the
PageRank algorithm [36].
This variation of our information diffusion simulation
shows that increasing the likelihood of this non-hiring
transmission modestly improves the spread of ideas orig-
inating from the lowest prestige universities (Figure 7),
as these universities now have some chance of trans-
mitting an idea to a more central institution. Even
very high jump probabilities, however, do not mitigate
the strong structural advantage in spreading that the
highest-prestige universities exhibit. Similarly, q has only
a marginal impact on the epidemic size produced by the
highest prestige institutions, whose ideas already tend to
spread widely across the network.
A Generic Tradeoff Between Prestige and Idea Fitness
Knowing that prestige exerts such a strong influence
on the spread of ideas across the network, we now con-
sider whether there exists a generic relationship between
the prestige of the originating university and the quality
of the idea it is spreading. In this way, we aim to quan-
tify the tradeoff between these two variables by asking:
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to a disconnected node. Transmission probability is held con-
stant at p = 0.1. Each data point represents an average over
500 trials. Colors correspond to different jump probabilities
q.
For a given epidemic size, how much must p increase to
compensate for a decrease in pi?
To begin, we stratify institutions into decile groups ac-
cording to their prestige. We then compute the average
epidemic size Y/N among universities in each decile, as
a function of transmission probability p, and fit logistic
functions to these data. This analysis reveals that ideas
originating from the lowest-prestige universities, even if
they are of the highest quality, are unlikely to spread
to the whole network (red line, Figure 8A), and again
reinforces the substantial structural advantage afforded
to more prestigious universities. As a result, less presti-
gious universities face substantial structural barriers in
the spread of their original ideas, independent of their
quality, which may play a role in persistent epistemic in-
equality and the dominance of elite universities in the
pace and direction of scientific progress.
To quantify the precise relationship among prestige pi,
idea quality p, and epidemic size Y , we use a technique
from statistical physics called a “data collapse” to ex-
tract a generic functional form. When a set of curves are
parameterized special cases of a more general function,
the generic function can be identified and estimated by
“rescaling” the individual curves so that they collapse
onto each other [37]. To obtain this function, we rescale
the decile curves in Figure 8A using an ansatz that re-
lates p and d, the decile of prestige, i.e., 0.1 for the top
10% most prestigious universities, 0.2 for the next 10%,
etc.:
p∗ = −p / log(1− d) .
This ansatz converts p and d into an “effective” trans-
mission probability p∗, and its form illustrates the expo-
nential rescaling effect of prestige (via the decile variable
d now) on the raw transmission probability p. Hence,
as the prestige of the originating university decreases,
in order to produce an epidemic of equivalent size, the
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universities in a prestige decile. (B) Epidemic sizes for normalized transmission probabilities. Each data point represents an
average across all universities in a decile, and across the 1000 trials for each university, transmission probability pair.
transmission probability of the idea must increase at an
exponential rate to compensate.
Replotting the the epidemic size data as a function of
the effective transmission probability produces the data
collapse (Figure 8B), and confirms the existence of a
generic functional relationship, in which epidemic size
varies as a function of p and d alone, via p∗:
Y
N
=
[
1 + er(k+log p
∗)
]−1
,
where r and k are constants of best fit. Under this func-
tion, a choice of prestige decile d that originates an idea
and a choice of idea quality p would allow us to roughly
predict the fraction of the network the idea will eventu-
ally reach.
V. CONCLUSION
Past studies of scholarly productivity and affiliation
suggest that researchers at elite institutions play an out-
sized role in driving the pace and direction of scientific
progress [2–10]. Here, using comprehensive data on fac-
ulty hiring events in the field of computer science, we
investigated the consequences of a university’s prestige
on the diffusion of ideas it originates. Using epidemic
models to simulate the spread of ideas across the faculty
hiring network, we find that ideas originating from more
prestigious universities produce larger epidemic sizes and
longer epidemic lengths. Consequently, ideas starting in
the network periphery (i.e., at less prestigious universi-
ties) must be much higher in quality to have similar suc-
cess as lower quality ideas originating in the core (more
prestigious universities). These findings suggest that idea
dissemination within academia is not meritocratic, even
when the assessment of the idea’s quality (transmission
probability p) is entirely objective.
While these results may appear intuitive, our study
provides a detailed and quantitative characterization of
the theoretical consequences of institutional prestige on
the spread of ideas across the scientific community. These
measurements build upon the notion that research ideas
spread throughout academia by way of faculty hiring, ei-
ther through the direct transfer of researchers working on
a particular topic or by the lines of communication cre-
ated between placing and hiring institutions [4, 20]. We
tested the hypothesis that faculty hiring acts as a mecha-
nism for the spread of ideas by carefully cross-inspecting
DBLP publication data and faculty hiring events, show-
ing that indeed, faculty hiring plays a statistically signifi-
cant role in driving the spread of some ideas. Specifically,
the spread of the research topics incremental computa-
tion, topic modeling, quantum computing, and mecha-
nism design was significantly driven by faculty hiring
events in our network. The same could not be said for
deep learning, however, which may suggest that deep
learning is a less specialized, possibly less well-defined,
research topic. Alternatively, deep learning may simply
represent a particularly high-quality idea, whose adop-
tion was both widespread and rapid (see Figure 4).
Our investigation of these five areas of research was
limited by matching keywords to titles of publications,
and for computer science faculty only. Analysis of full-
text articles or abstracts would facilitate more precise
detection of publications relevant to particular research
areas [38]. Along these lines, a more detailed analysis of
how robust the faculty hiring mechanism is under a more
specific, or more broad, definition of a research area is an
interesting and important direction of research. Future
work should consider extending the analyses performed
here to other departments where faculty hiring network
data are available. Subsequently, our analyses of idea dif-
fusion suppose that faculty hiring provides the primary
conduit for the spread of research and models all other
modes of diffusion using a small, uniform jump proba-
bility that connects all universities. To the extent that
these other modes of diffusion are structured and can be
measured, future work should consider modeling their ef-
9fects directly to provide more realistic estimates of idea
diffusion.
Additionally our work focuses on faculty hiring as a
mechanism for the spread of ideas throughout academia.
Certainly, other mechanisms exist that influence the dis-
semination of ideas, including those mediated by the sci-
entific literature and its underlying citation network. Our
analysis of the random jump model helps explain the
transmission of ideas under transmission mechanisms in-
dependent of prestige. If we believe that many other
mechanisms that drive the spread of ideas are strongly
correlated with prestige, as is the case for citation net-
works [2, 10, 20, 39], then despite the fact that these
mechanisms are different from the one we are testing,
the inclusion of their effects in our analysis might only
slightly mitigate the structural advantage we observe.
Our results suggest that researchers at prestigious
institutions benefit substantially from a structural ad-
vantage that allows their ideas to more easily spread
throughout the network of institutions, and consequen-
tially, impact the discourse of science. This advantage
presumes that ideas spread according to a purely merito-
cratic notion of idea quality and that ideas of high quality
can originate from any institution. If it is instead the case
that the quality of an idea is correlated with its origina-
tion (i.e., high quality ideas are more likely to come from
prestigious institutions) then the quality of an idea would
act as a confounding factor to the faculty hiring mecha-
nism. Producing an objective, empirical measurement of
an idea’s quality is difficult and would require, for exam-
ple, an assertion of the relative worth of advancements in
theory versus methodology, which remains an open prob-
lem. Nevertheless, past research supports the existence of
a “halo effect” in science [8, 40, 41], whereby ideas are
perceived as being of higher quality if they originate from
prestigious institutions and researchers. As such, our re-
sults may indicate only a lower bound for the actual ad-
vantage of that elite universities enjoy. Future studies
should consider modeling non-meritocratic factors such
as the halo effect in addition to the purely meritocratic
effects analyzed in our study.
A difficult question left unanswered by this work is
what, if anything, should be done about the impact of
non-meritocratic social mechanisms on epistemic inequal-
ity in scientific discourse. Our results indicate that fac-
ulty hiring is one social mechanism that drives this in-
equality, and past work has established that university
prestige drives faculty hiring [27]. Hence, if differences
in faculty placement rates across universities remain un-
changed (i.e., institutions continue to hire faculty with
doctorates from a small number of elite departments),
then the current highly differential spread of ideas is un-
likely to change on its own.
Somewhat more optimistically, our results show that
while lower quality ideas will tend to be overshadowed
by comparable ideas from more prestigious institutions,
high quality ideas circulate widely, regardless of their ori-
gin. Epistemic inequality, then, could be mitigated by
incentivizing researchers to produce a smaller number of
higher quality studies over a larger number of incremen-
tal, low-quality studies. Additionally, there may be op-
portunities to mitigate epistemic inequality through new
technologies and careful experimentation [42]. For exam-
ple, the adoption of double-blind review processes [43]
and the practice of posting early manuscripts online may
facilitate the visibility of high quality ideas from less pres-
tigious universities. However, these online tools may also
amplify academia’s existing inequalities [44]. Continued
experimentation of this form will be important for mon-
itoring the effects of policy on epistemic inequality in
science. We look forward to more work on understand-
ing the mechanisms that create and maintain epistemic
inequality, and innovative ideas to promote the free cir-
culation of good ideas.
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